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Abstract
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, deﬁned on the set of pairs
of an allocation and a preference proﬁle of any ﬁnite population. It is meant to unify
evaluations and comparisons of social states with populations of possibly diﬀerent
sizes with various characteristics. The universal social ordering not only evaluates
policy options for a given population but also compares social welfare across popu-
lations, as in international or intertemporal comparisons of living standards. It also
makes it possible to evaluate policy options which aﬀect the size of the population
or the preferences of its members. We study how to extend the theory of social
choice in order to select such orderings on a rigorous axiomatic basis. Key ingredi-
ents in this analysis are attitudes with respect to population size and the bases of
interpersonal comparisons.
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11 Introduction
Welfare economics and the theory of social choice, since Samuelson’s (1947) and Arrow’s
(1951) seminal contributions, have mostly focused on the issue of evaluating social states
and the impact of public policies for a given population with given preferences, over
a domain of possible proﬁles of preferences. There are, however, other kinds of social
evaluation that are often needed. For instance, the measurement of growth is often
criticized for focusing on the volume of production and failing to accurately reﬂect the
evolution of welfare, but measuring the evolution of welfare, especially over a long period of
time, would require making comparisons of social welfare across populations with diﬀerent
size and diﬀerent preferences. Similarly, international comparisons involve comparing the
situations of countries with diﬀerent populations. Moreover, policies which may aﬀect
the size of the population or the preferences of its members cannot be assessed with the
standard tools of social choice.
In this paper, we propose an extension of welfare economics and social choice theory
meant to cover these important needs for ethical evaluation. A universal social ordering
evaluates and ranks states that are described by pairs of a distribution of resources and
characteristics of the corresponding population of any size. Such an ordering makes it
possible not only to answer standard questions of social choice — “Is an allocation better
than another, for a given population?” — but also any question of the following sort:
“Is the situation of a certain population at a certain time or location better than that of
another population at another time or location?”
Moreover, as the size of the populations involved in such questions can be any from
a single individual to billions, a universal social ordering also encompasses interpersonal
comparisons — “Is an individual consuming a certain bundle with certain preferences
better-oﬀ than another individual with another bundle and diﬀerent preferences?”. Thus,
our present study may be considered an attempt to unify various kinds of social or individ-
ual comparisons commonly accomplished in welfare economics and social choice theory,
and we focus on “consistency” between these comparisons of diﬀerent types. In this uniﬁed
framework, we will see that some analytical separation is possible between the question
2of interpersonal comparisons and the question of social aggregation because for any given
ordering that compares individual situations, the considerations relevant to extending this
ordering into a universal social ordering are basically the same.
The questions addressed here were already raised by Sen (1976, 1979) when he ex-
amined how to make international comparisons of living standards. In particular, Sen
examined the question of comparing situations of populations with diﬀerent preferences.
He was confronted with the diﬃculty that it may happen that population A is better-
oﬀ, in its own eyes, than population B, while population B deems itself better-oﬀ than
population A. As a result, the criterion proposed by Sen was incomplete and could not
rank all possible situations. We propose a way to solve this diﬃculty and the orderings
studied in this paper are complete even when diﬀerent populations have diﬀerent prefer-
ences. In addition, Sen examined how to compare situations of populations of diﬀerent
sizes, and he noticed that in the context of international comparisons it is quite natural
to require the social ordering to be indiﬀerent to the size of the population. Indeed, it
would be strange to consider the population of Luxembourg less well-oﬀ than the Chinese
population just because of size. He deduced that the social criterion could focus on the
statistical distribution of individual situations for a normalized population size.
Although indiﬀerence to size appears very reasonable in the context of international
comparisons, there are other contexts, studied in particular by the theory of popula-
tion ethics,1 in which a deﬁnite preference about the size of the population is defensible.
For instance, assessing the evolution of the world population, or even the evolution of a
particular nation over time, may involve considerations on the optimal size of the popula-
tion. We thus think that diﬀerent universal social orderings which reﬂect diﬀerent ethical
attitudes toward population size should be called for, depending on the context, e.g.,
depending on whether one wants to determine the optimal size of the world population
or to compare the situation of two diﬀerent countries. While neutrality with respect to
population size seems reasonable for the latter exercise, a more positive attitude toward
size (when welfare is suﬃciently high) may be adopted for the former. In this respect,
1Important recent contributions to this theory include Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) and
Broome (2004).
3the theory of universal social orderings proposed in this paper is quite general and may
be useful to address a broad set of issues, with diﬀerent universal social orderings being
devised for diﬀerent contexts.
The basic ethical principles for comparisons of social states in this paper are taken
from a recent literature at the intersection of the theory of social choice and the theory
of fair allocation. For ﬁxed populations, this literature proposes social orderings that
incorporate fairness principles.2 We extend this approach to the evaluation of allocations
for variable populations.
The paper is organized as follows. The formal framework and the notion of universal
social ordering are introduced in Section 2. Basic ethical requirements about the social
aggregation part of the problem are described in Section 3. The main results are stated
in Section 4 and proved in Section 5. They consist of axiomatic characterizations of two
families of universal social orderings, which diﬀer in their attitude toward population size
and may therefore be applicable to diﬀerent contexts of social evaluation, or correspond to
genuinely diﬀerent ethical views of population ethics. These are two families of orderings,
not just two orderings, and for each family a particular member is deﬁned by the way in
which interpersonal comparisons are performed. In Section 6 we show how simple fairness
conditions may impose speciﬁc metrics for interpersonal comparisons and thereby guide
the choice of a particular member for each family. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The model describes situations of ﬁnite populations with ordinal preferences over con-
sumption bundles.
The set of real numbers (resp., natural numbers) is denoted R (resp., N). Let N be the
countably inﬁnite set of potential individuals. Let ` be the ﬁnite number of commodities.
We assume that the set N and the number ` are ﬁxed. Let S be the set of all non-empty
ﬁnite subsets of N, i.e., the set of possible populations. For every S 2 S, jSj denotes the
2The theory of fair allocation rules is surveyed in Moulin and Thomson (1997) and in Thomson (2004).
Surveys on fair social orderings can be found in Fleurbaey (2006) and Maniquet (2007).
4cardinality of S, i.e., the size of the population.
A reﬂexive, transitive, and complete binary relation is called an ordering. In every
particular social state to be evaluated, involving a population S 2 S, each individual
i 2 S is endowed with a preference ordering Ri on a consumption set X µ R`. To ﬁx
ideas, we assume throughout the paper that X = R`
+; but the theorems in Section 4 hold
for any X that is convex, bounded from below (i.e., there is q 2 R` such that q · x for
all x 2 X)3 and upper-comprehensive (i.e., if x 2 X and y ¸ x; then y 2 X). Let R
be the set of all continuous, convex, and weakly monotonic (i.e., xi ¸ yi implies xi Ri yi
and xi À yi implies xi Pi yi) preference orderings on X.4 For all Ri 2 R and all xi 2 X,
the indiﬀerence set at xi for Ri is deﬁned as I(xi;Ri) := fyi 2 X j yi Ii xig: Let S 2 S
be given. A preference proﬁle for S is a list of preference orderings of the members of S:
RS := (Ri)i2S 2 RjSj. An allocation for S is a vector xS := (xi)i2S 2 XjSj.
A universal social ordering is an ordering % deﬁned on
S
S2S[XjSj £ RjSj]. For all
S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj£RjSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2 XjTj£RjTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) can
be interpreted as follows: the state in which the members of group S with the preferences
RS consume xS is at least as good as the state in which the members of group T with
the preferences R0
T consume yT. For convenience, we let (xS;RS) also denote the vector
(xi;Ri)i2S 2 (X £ R)
jSj ; and we identify XjSj £ RjSj with (X £ R)
jSj.
Throughout the paper, every universal social ordering is assumed to be anonymous,
i.e., for all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj£RjSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2 XjTj£RjTj, (xS;RS) »
(yT;R0
T) if there is a bijection ¹ : S ! T such that for all i 2 S; xi = y¹(i) and Ri = R0
¹(i):
A universal social ordering can be used for various kinds of evaluations, such as:
1. Comparisons of allocations for a given population (a region, a country, the world).
For group S with preferences RS, which allocation is socially better, xS or yS?
2. International comparisons of allocations. Which social state is better, country S
with the allocation xS and population preferences RS or country T with the alloca-
3Vector inequalities are as usual: ¸;>; and À.
4Continuity and weak monotonicity of preferences are indispensable for our results, but convexity is
not and is introduced only to make it clear that no result depends on non-standard preferences.
5tion yT and preferences R0
T?
3. Intertemporal comparisons of allocations. At which time are the people better-oﬀ,
the present time when the people with preferences RS consume xS, or one hundred
years ago when the people with preferences R0
T consumed yT?
4. Interpersonal comparisons of individual states. Which individual state is better,
individual i with preferences Ri consuming xi or individual j with preferences Rj
consuming yj?
Most of the literature on social choice theory addresses issues like (1) in this list and
only compares allocations for a given population. The concept of universal ordering en-
larges the scope of evaluations and provides a uniﬁed framework to also make comparisons
as in the other items of the list.
3 Axioms
In order to ﬁnd reasonable universal social orderings, we ﬁrst formulate properties of such
orderings. A list of these properties, usually called axioms in the theory of social choice,
is proposed in this section. The properties are classiﬁed into three groups: The ﬁrst group
is about the informational basis of comparisons of individual states, the second about the
fairness of social states with a ﬁxed population, and the third about the consistency or
relationship between comparisons of states with variable populations.
3.1 Informational basis of comparisons of individual states
The ﬁrst property expresses a basic principle of consumer sovereignty: In the evaluation
of a given individual’s states, the universal social ordering should espouse this individual’s
preferences over consumption bundles.
Consumer Sovereignty. For all i 2 N, all Ri 2 R, and all xi;yi 2 X, (xi;Ri) % (yi;Ri)
if and only if xi Ri yi.
6The second axiom requires that, in order to evaluate and compare states for a given
individual, it should be suﬃcient to look at the indiﬀerence sets of the individual at the
consumption bundles under consideration.





i 2 R, if I(xi;Ri) = I(xi;R00
i) and I(yi;R0
i) = I(yi;R000
i ), then (xi;Ri) %
(yi;R0
i) if and only if (xi;R00
i) % (yi;R000
i ).
The third axiom requires the evaluation of individual states not to be sensitive to
inﬁnitesimal changes in the bundle consumed by the individual.5
Individual Continuity. For all i 2 N, all (x0;R0) 2 R`
+ £ R, and all Ri 2 R, the sets
©
xi 2 R`





+ j (x0;R0) % (xi;Ri)
ª
are closed.
3.2 Fairness of social states with a ﬁxed population
The next axiom is a fairness requirement which is inspired by the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle and is adapted here to our multidimensional framework. This axiom has been
playing a central role in the theory of fair social orderings. It recommends transfers from
an agent to another when the latter has less of every good in his bundle, provided that
these two agents have the same preferences. Note that the post-transfer allocation is only
required to be at least as good as the pre-transfer allocation, although all the orderings
studied in the next section will actually strictly prefer the post-transfer allocation.
Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences. For all S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, all xS;yS 2 XjSj,
and all i;j 2 S, if Ri = Rj, and there exists i;j 2 S and ± 2 R`
++ such that
yi À xi = yi ¡ ± À xj = yj + ± À yj;
and xk = yk for all k 6= i;j, then (xS;RS) % (yS;RS).
5Although this may sound like a merely technical condition, it is shown in the appendix that in its
absence one cannot exclude social orderings which give absolute priority to the best-oﬀ in some cases.
73.3 Relationship between comparisons of states with variable
populations
We now turn to axioms dealing directly or indirectly with the issue of population size.
The ﬁrst one is separability, requiring an agent who has the same bundle in two allocations
to play no role in the evaluation of these two allocations, so that removing him from the
population would not aﬀect the evaluation.
Separability. For all S 2 S with jSj ¸ 2, all (xS;RS);(yS;R0
S) 2 XjSj£RjSj; and all i 2
S, if xi = yi and Ri = R0
i, then (xS;RS) % (yS;R0
S) if and only if (xSnfig;RSnfig) %
(ySnfig;R0
Snfig):
The next axiom is similar but it extends separability to the case in which the two
allocations involve diﬀerent populations both of which contain the same “unconcerned”
individual.
Strong Separability. For all S;T 2 S with S \ T 6= ; and jSj;jTj ¸ 2, all i 2 S \ T,
and all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £ RjSj and (yT;R0
T) 2 XjTj £ RjTj, if xi = yi and Ri = R0
i,
then (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (xSnfig;RSnfig) % (yTnfig;R0
Tnfig):
A more radical indiﬀerence to population size is introduced in the next axiom which
says that only the distribution of individual situations matters, not the size of the pop-
ulation. This requirement seems particularly suitable for international comparisons of
standards of living or for evaluations of welfare growth over time. Here we need to in-
troduce the replication operator. For any positive integer k; let xkS := (xS;:::;xS | {z }
k times
) and
RkS := (RS;:::;RS | {z }
k times
): As we assume that every universal social ordering is anonymous,
the pair (xkS;RkS) can be evaluated by every ordering even though kS is not, strictly
speaking, an element of S:
Replication Indiﬀerence. For all S 2 S, for all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £ RjSj, all k 2 N;
(xS;RS) » (xkS;RkS):
8This axiom was introduced by Sen (1976). He used the property to extend an index
of real national income to the cases of diﬀerent sizes of population.
The next axiom is borrowed from the theory of population ethics6 and requires that
it should be possible to add a new individual to the population without changing the
social value of the state.
Indiﬀerent Addition. For all S 2 S, and all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £RjSj, there exist xi 2 X
and Ri 2 R such that (xS[fig;RS[fig) » (xS;RS).
4 Solutions
In this section we introduce and characterize two diﬀerent families of universal social or-
derings on the basis of the axioms deﬁned in the previous section. Each family contains
a variety of speciﬁc orderings which may diﬀer in particular about how to perform inter-
personal comparisons. The speciﬁcation of interpersonal comparisons will be the topic of
Section 6.
A new piece of notation is necessary. Let a universal social ordering % be given.
For all S 2 S and all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £ RjSj, let µ(xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj be a vector of
the pairs (xi;Ri) arranged by increasing order, i.e., such that for all k 2 f1;:::;jSj ¡ 1g,
µk+1(xS;RS) % µk(xS;RS). The following property of universal social orderings involves
the lexicographic extension of the maximin criterion, applied to populations of the same
size.
Leximin. A universal social ordering % is a leximin ordering if for all S;T 2 S with
jSj = jTj; all xS;yT 2 XjSj and all RS;R0
T 2 RjSj;
(i) (xS;RS) Â (yT;R0
T) if and only if there exists m 2 N, m · jSj; such that
µk(xS;RS) » µk(yT;R0
T) for all k < m, and µm(xS;RS) Â µm(yT;R0
T); and
(ii) (xS;RS) » (yT;R0
T) if and only if µk(xS;RS) » µk(yT;R0
T) for all k · jSj.
The two families of orderings deﬁned below are subfamilies of the family of leximin
orderings and diverge on the attitude toward population size. The ﬁrst family, called
6Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005), in particular, make use of a similar axiom.
9relative leximin, is completely neutral about population size and is only concerned about
the distribution of individual well-being.
Relative leximin. A universal social ordering % is a relative leximin ordering if (i)
it is a leximin ordering, and (ii) for all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj,
and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (xjTjS;RjTjS) %
(yjSjT;R0
jSjT).
To deﬁne the second family of orderings, we consider functions C such that for
all S 2 S, and all (xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj, C(xS;RS) 2 X £ R. Such a function is
called a critical level function because it is used in the following deﬁnition in such a way
that the addition of a new individual i to (xS;RS) is neutral if his situation is the pair
(xi;Ri) = C(xS;RS):
Critical level leximin. A universal social ordering % is a critical level leximin order-
ing if (i) it is a leximin ordering, and (ii) there exists a critical level function C
such that for all S;T 2 S with jSj < jTj, all (xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj, and all
(yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if there exist Q µ N n S
with jQj = jTj ¡ jSj and (xQ;RQ) = ((x1;R1);:::;(xjQj;RjQj)) 2 (X £ R)jQj such
that (x1;R1) = C(xS;RS) and (xk;Rk) = C((xS;RS);(x1;R1);:::;(xk¡1;Rk¡1)) for
all k 2 f2;:::;jQjg, and (xS[Q;RS[Q) % (yT;R0
T).
5 Characterizations
We are now ready to characterize these two families of solutions on the basis of the axioms
introduced in section 3.
Theorem 1 Assme that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. Then, % satisﬁes Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence if and only if it
is a relative leximin ordering.
10A leximin ordering is not continuous, although the orderings characterized here rely
on a continuous ordering of individual states. There is no paradox in this conﬁguration
because the two notions of continuity apply at diﬀerent levels. The discontinuity of a
leximin ordering occurs only in prioritizing individuals when several individuals have con-
ﬂicting interests. This is fully compatible with having a continuous measure of individual
welfare. Adding full continuity of % to the list of axioms in our theorems would entail an
impossibility.
Theorem 2 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. Then, % satisﬁes Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition if and only if it is a
critical level leximin ordering.
Although Replication Indiﬀerence and Indiﬀerent Addition are generally compatible,
they become incompatible in the presence of the other axioms and the two families sin-
gled out in these theorems are disjoint. In order to see this, consider (x;R) Á (y;R0):
By Indiﬀerent Addition, there must exist (z;R00) such that ((x;R);(z;R00);(y;R0)) »










The latter is impossible, because the left-hand allocation is preferred by a Leximin ordering
if (z;R00) Â (x;R) and the right-hand allocation is preferred if (z;R00) - (x;R):
Whereas a relative leximin ordering is fully speciﬁed once a leximin ordering for ﬁxed
populations is given, a critical level leximin ordering involves an additional free parameter,
namely, the critical level function C: The next result, which is similar to results from the
theory of population ethics (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson, 2005), provides some
precision about this function: it can be chosen to be constant if the universal social
ordering satisﬁes Strong Separability.
Constant critical level leximin. A universal social ordering % is a constant critical
level leximin ordering if it satisﬁes the following properties:
11(i) % is a leximin ordering, and
(ii) there exists (x0;R0) 2 X £ R such that for all S;T 2 S with jSj < jTj, all
(xS;RS) 2 (X£R)jSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X£R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only
if (xS[Q;RS[Q) % (yT;R0
T) where Q µ N nS, jQj = jTj¡jSj, and (xi;Ri) = (x0;R0)
for all i 2 Q.
Theorem 3 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. Then, % satisﬁes Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, Strong Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition if and only if
it is a constant critical level leximin ordering.
6 Proofs
The proofs of these theorems involve several lemmas. In the appendix, we check that all
axioms are needed for the necessity parts of the theorems.
Let xi;yi 2 X and Ri;R0
i 2 R. We say that I(xi;Ri) is above I(yi;R0
i) if for every
z0
i 2 I(yi;R0
i), there exists zi 2 I(xi;Ri) such that zi À z0
i. Note that if I(xi;Ri) is above
I(yi;R0
i), then by weak monotonicity of preferences I(xi;Ri) \ I(yi;R0
i) = ?.
Lemma 1 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty and Individual
Hansson Independence, then for all R;R0 2 R, and all x;y 2 X, if I(x;R) = I(y;R0)
then (x;R) » (y;R0); and if I(x;R) is above I(y;R0), then (x;R) Â (y;R0):
Proof. Let R;R0 2 R, and x;y 2 X be such that I(x;R) = I(y;R0): Suppose that
(x;R) Á (y;R0): As I(x;R) = I(y;R0); one has y 2 I(x;R) and Consumer Sovereignty
implies (y;R) » (x;R): By transitivity, (y;R) Á (y;R0): Since I(y;R) = I(y;R0); a direct
application of Individual Hansson Independence implies (y;R0) Á (y;R); a contradiction.
If I(x;R) is above I(y;R0); then there exists R0 such that I(x;R) = I(x;R0) and
I(y;R0) = I(y;R0): By weak monotonicity of preferences, xP0y: By Consumer Sovereignty,
(x;R0) Â (y;R0): Therefore, by Individual Hansson Independence, (x;R) Â (y;R0):
12Lemma 2 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Separability. Then, for all
S;T 2 S with jSj = jTj, all xS;yT 2 XjSj, and all RS;R0
T 2 RjSj; if there exists a bijection
¹ : S ! T such that (xi;Ri) % (y¹(i);R0
¹(i)) for all i 2 S, then (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T); and if
in addition, (xi;Ri) Â (y¹(i);R0
¹(i)) for some i 2 S; then (xS;RS) Â (yT;R0
T):
Proof. Let S;T 2 S with jSj = jTj, xS;yT 2 XjSj, and RS;R0
T 2 RjSj. Deﬁne
R00
S 2 RjSj and zS 2 XjSj as R00
i = R0




Suppose that (xi;Ri) % (y¹(i);R0
¹(i)) for all i 2 S. As (zi;R00
i) - (xi;Ri) for all i 2 S,









By transitivity, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T).
If (zi;R00
i) Á (xi;Ri) for some i 2 S, strict preference occurs in one of these chains
and by transitivity, (xS;RS) Â (yT;R0
T).
It follows from Lemma 2 that Consumer Sovereignty and Separability imply Strong
Pareto: For all S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, and all xS;yS 2 XjSj, if xi Ri yi for all i 2 S, then
(xS;RS) % (yS;RS), and if in addition xi Pi yi for some i 2 S, then (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS).
We now introduce a stronger version of Hansson Independence.
Hansson Independence For all S;T 2 S, for all (xS;RS) 2 R
jSj`




+ £ RjTj, all R00
S 2 RjSj and R000
T 2 RjTj; if I(xi;Ri) = I(xi;R00
i) for all i 2 S
and I(yi;R0
i) = I(yi;R000
i ) for all i 2 T, then (xS;RS) % (yT;R0




Lemma 3 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence, and Separability, then it satisﬁes Hansson Independence.
Proof. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,







S 2 RjSj, and R000
T 2 RjTj. Suppose that I(xi;Ri) = I(xi;R00
i) for
all i 2 S and I(yi;R0
i) = I(yi;R000
i ) for all i 2 T. By Lemma 1, (xi;Ri) » (xi;R00
i) for all i 2
S and (yi;R0
i) » (yi;R000









Lemma 4 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and Separability.
Then, for all S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, all xS;yS 2 XjSj, and all i;j 2 S, if
(yi;Ri) Â (xi;Ri) Â (xj;Rj) Â (yj;Rj);
and (xk;Rk) Â (yk;Rk) for all k 6= i;j, then (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS).
Proof. By Lemmas 2 and 3, % satisﬁes Strong Pareto and Hansson Independence.
From Fleurbaey (2007b, Lemma 1), one deduces that for X = R`
+; if a universal social
ordering % satisﬁes Strong Pareto, Hansson Independence, and Pigou-Dalton for Equal
Preferences, then it satisﬁes the following property, which we call Property P: For all
S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, all xS;yS 2 XjSj, and all i;j 2 S, if Ri = Rj and yi Pi xi Pi xj Pi yj,
and xk Pk yk for all k 6= i;j, then (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS). (This result extends to any set X
that is convex, bounded from below and upper-comprehensive.)
Let S 2 S, RS 2 RjSj, xS;yS 2 XjSj, and i;j 2 S. Assume that (yi;Ri) Â (xi;Ri) Â
(xj;Rj) Â (yj;Rj) and (xk;Rk) Â (yk;Rk) for all k 6= i;j. By Consumer Sovereignty and
continuity of Rj, there is zj 2 X such that (xj;Rj) Â (zj;Rj) Â (yj;Rj): Let q 2 X
and R0 2 R be such that I(q;R0) is above I(yi;Ri) and I(xj;Rj), I(xj;R0) = I(xj;Rj);
I(yj;R0) = I(yj;Rj); and I(zj;R0) = I(zj;Rj): By Lemma 1, (q;R0) Â (yi;Ri), (xj;R0) »





























By transitivity, (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS).
Lemma 5 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence and Individual Continuity, then for all t 2 N; t ¸ 2; for all i 2 N,
all R1;:::;Rt 2 R, and all x1;:::;xt 2 X such that (x1;R1) - ¢¢¢ - (xt;Rt) there exists
R0 2 R and z1;:::;zt 2 X such that (xk;Rk) » (zk;R0) for all k = 1;:::;t:
Proof. Consider R1;:::;Rt 2 R and x1;:::;xt 2 X such that (x1;R1) - ¢¢¢ -
(xt;Rt): Let q 2 X and R0 2 R be such that I(q;R0) is above I(x1;R1) and I(xt;Rt).
There exists R0 2 R such that I(q;R0) = I(q;R0) and I(x1;R0) = I(x1;R1), and there
exists R00 2 R such that I(q;R00) = I(q;R0) and I(xt;R00) = I(xt;Rt):
By Consumer Sovereignty and weak monotonicity of preferences, (q;R00) Â (xt;R00)
and therefore, by Lemma 1, (q;R0) Â (xt;Rt): As (q;R0) » (q;R0); one has (q;R0) Â
(xt;Rt): Let z1 = x1: One has (z1;R0) » (x1;R1): Take any k = 2;:::;t. One has
(x1;R1) - (xk;Rk) - (xt;Rt) » (xt;R00) Á (q;R00) » (q;R0), implying (x1;R0) -
(xk;Rk) Á (q;R0): By Individual Continuity, there is zk 2 X such that (xk;Rk) » (zk;R0).
Lemma 6 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Continuity, Individual Hansson Independence, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Pref-
erences, and Separability. Then, for all S 2 S, all xS;yS 2 XjSj; and all RS 2 RjSj; if
µ1(xS;RS) Â µ1(yS;RS), then (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS).
Proof. By Lemma 5, there exist R0
S 2 R and x0
S;y0
S 2 XjSj such that for all i;j 2 S,
R0
i = R0
j and for all i 2 S; (x0
i;R0
i) » (xi;Ri) and (y0
i;R0
i) » (yi;Ri): By Lemma 2,
(x0
S;R0
S) » (xS;RS) and (y0
S;R0
S) » (yS;RS).
By a repeated application of Lemma 4 (or, simply, Property P from the proof of that









15is standard and is just sketched here. Start from (y0
S;R0
S); raise all individuals except a
worst-oﬀ i0 above µjSj(x0
S;R0
S) —an improvement by Lemma 2. Then, for each i 6= i0,
pull i down to a situation equivalent to µ1(x0
S;R0
S) while i0 is moved up but remains
below µ1(x0
S;R0
S) —an improvement by Lemma 4. The resulting allocation is worse than
(x0
S;R0





By transitivity, one has (xS;RS) Â (yS;RS).
Lemma 7 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and
Separability, then it is a leximin ordering.
Proof. Let S;T 2 S such that jSj = jTj, RS;R0
T 2 RjSj, and xS;yT 2 XjSj. If
µk(xS;RS) » µk(yT;R0
T), then by Lemma 2, (xS;RS) » (yT;R0
T).
Assume that there exists m 2 N, m · jSj, such that µk(xS;RS) » µk(yT;R0
T) for all
k 2 N with k < m, and µm(xS;RS) Â µm(yT;R0
T). Take V 2 S such that jV j = jSj: By
Lemma 5, there exist x0
V;y0
V 2 XjSj and R00
V 2 RjSj such that
(i) R00
i = R00
j for all i;j 2 V ,






¹T(i)) for all i 2 V , and
(iii) x0
i = y0
i for all i 2 V such that for some k < m; (x0
i;R00
i) » µk(xS;RS):
Let M ½ V denote the subgroup of the m¡1 agents in V satisfying condition (iii) above.
Let zM be such that for all i 2 M; (zi;R00
i) » µm(x0
V;R00


































By Lemma 2, (x0
V;R00
V) » (xS;RS) and (y0
V;R00
V) » (yT;R0
T): By transitivity, (xS;RS) Â
(yT;RT).
Remark 1 In Lemma 6, Separability could be replaced by the following property requir-
ing a monotonic relation of the evaluation of social states to the evaluations of individual
situations:
16Monotonicity. For all S 2 S, for all (xS;RS);(yS;R0
S) 2 XjSj£RjSj; if (xi;Ri) % (yi;R0
i)
for all i 2 S, then (xS;RS) % (yS;R0
S); if, in addition, (xi;Ri) Â (yi;R0
i) for some
i 2 S, then (xS;RS) Â (yS;R0
S):
In Lemma 7, the proof only uses the following weak version of Separability, in which
the unconcerned agent is not removed from the population:
Weak Separability. For all S 2 S such that jSj ¸ 2, all (xS;RS);(yS;R0
S) 2 XjSj£RjSj;
all i 2 S, and all x0
i 2 X, if xi = yi and Ri = R0














As a consequence, Theorems 1 and 2 admit variants in which Monotonicity is added to
the list of axioms and Weak Separability is substituted for Separability. (End of Remark)
Lemma 8 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Sep-
arability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, then it is a relative leximin ordering.
Proof. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Sep-
arability, and Replication Indiﬀerence. By Lemma 7, % is a leximin ordering. Let
S;T 2 S, xS 2 XjSj; yT 2 XjTj; RS 2 RjSj, and RT 2 RjTj. By Replication Invariance,
(xS;RS) » (xjTjS;RjTjS) and (yT;RT) » (yjSjT;RjSjT). Therefore, (xS;RS) % (yT;RT) ,
(xjTjS;RjTjS) % (yjSjT;RjSjT):
Lemma 9 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Sep-
arability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, then it is a critical leval leximin ordering.
Proof. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Prefer-
ences, Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition. By Lemma 7, % is a leximin ordering.
17For all S 2 S, and all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £ RjSj, deﬁne C(xS;RS) 2 X £ R as a pair
(xi;Ri) 2 X £ R such that ((xS;RS);(xi;Ri)) » (xS;RS). By Indiﬀerent Addition, such
a pair (xi;Ri) exists.
Let S;T 2 S with jSj < jTj, xS 2 XjSj; yT 2 XjTj; RS 2 RjSj, and RT 2 RjTj.
Let Q µ N n S and (xQ;RQ) 2 XjQj £ RjQj be such that jQj = jTj ¡ jSj:and
(xQ;RQ) = ((x1;R1);:::;(xjQj;RjQj)) with (x1;R1) = C(xS;RS) and (xk;Rk) =
C((xS;RS);(x1;R1);:::;(xk¡1;Rk¡1)) for all k 2 f2;:::;jQjg. Then, by construction, we
have (xS[Q;RS[Q) » (xS;RS). By transitivity, (xS;RS) % (yT;RT) , (xS[Q;RS[Q) %
(yT;RT): Thus, % is a critical level leximin ordering.
Lemma 10 If a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individ-
ual Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences,
Strong Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, then it is a constant critical level leximin
ordering.
Proof. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Prefer-
ences, Strong Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition. By Theorem 2, % is a critical level
leximin ordering.
Let S;T 2 S, (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £RjSj; (yT;R0
T) 2 XjTj £RjTj: Let x0 2 X; R0 2 R be
such that (xS;RS) » ((xS;x0);(RS;R0)): Take some arbitrary x1 2 X; R1 2 R:
By Strong Separability ((xS;x1);(RS;R1)) » ((xS;x0;x1);(RS;R0;R1)): By Strong
Separability again, (x1;R1) » ((x0;x1);(R0;R1)); implying ((yT;x1);(R0
T;R1)) »
((yT;x0;x1);(R0
T;R0;R1)) and ﬁnally (yT;R0
T) » ((yT;x0);(R0
T;R0)): This shows that
the constant function C(xS;RS) = (x0;R0) for all (xS;RS) 2 XjSj £RjSj is a critical level
function for %.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer
Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. If it satisﬁes
Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, then by
Lemma 8, it is a relative leximin ordering. Conversely, if it is a relative leximin ordering,
18then, as can be easily checked, it satisﬁes Separability, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences,
and Replication Indiﬀerence.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that a a universal social ordering % satisﬁes
Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. If
it satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition,
then by Lemma 9, it is a critical level leximin ordering. Conversely, if it is a critical level
leximin ordering, then it satisﬁes Separability, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and
Indiﬀerent Addition.
Lemma 11 If a universal social ordering % is a constant critical level leximin ordering,
then it satisﬁes Strong Separability.
Proof. Assume that % is a constant critical level leximin ordering with the constant
critical level (x0;R0) 2 X£R. Let S;T 2 S be such that jTj > jSj ¸ 2 and S\T 6= ;. Let
(xS;RS) 2 XjSj£RjSj, and (yT;R0
T) 2 XjTj£RjTj. Assume that for some i 2 S\T, xi = yi
and Ri = R0
i. Let Q µ NnS be such that jQj = jTj¡jSj, and deﬁne (xQ;RQ) 2 XjQj£RjQj
by (xj;Rj) = (x0;R0) for all j 2 Q. Then, by the deﬁnition of a constant critical level
leximin ordering,
(i) (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (xS[Q;RS[Q) % (yT;R0
T), and
(ii) (xSnfig;RSnfig) % (yTnfig;R0
Tnfig) if and only if (x(Snfig)[Q;R(Snfig)[Q) % (yTnfig;R0
Tnfig).
By Separability,
(iii) (xS[Q;RS[Q) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (x(Snfig)[Q;R(Snfig)[Q) % (yTnfig;R0
Tnfig).
It follows from (i), (ii), and (iii) that (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (xSnfig;RSnfig) %
(yTnfig;R0
Tnfig).
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that a a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Con-
sumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence and Individual Continuity. If it
satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Strong Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addi-
tion, then by Lemma 10, it is a constant critical leval leximin ordering. Conversely, if
it is a constant critical level leximin ordering, then it satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton for Equal
Preferences, Indiﬀerent Addition, and, by Lemma 11, Strong Separability.
197 Interpersonal comparisons
The families of universal social orderings characterized in the previous section are left
imprecise on an important issue. They do not specify how interpersonal comparisons, i.e.,
relations of the sort (xi;Ri) % (xj;Rj); should be made. Any speciﬁcation of this compar-
ison that is exclusively based on the indiﬀerence sets I(xi;Ri) and I(xj;Rj) is compatible
with the axioms of the theorems. Interpersonal comparisons of this sort are common-
place in welfare economics (in particular, in Bergson-Samuelson welfare economics, in
cost-beneﬁt analysis, and in the theory of fair allocation), and one can argue that recent
philosophical theories of justice formulated in terms of resources have added support to
the economic tradition of rejecting non-ordinal utility information in interpersonal com-
parisons.7
As illustrations of such interpersonal comparisons, consider the following two exam-
ples, deﬁned for the case X = R`
+ that is studied in this paper:
(1) The Pazner-Schmeidler interpersonal comparisons.
For each individual i, each bundle xi and each preference relation Ri, consider the fraction
of a given reference bundle ! 2 R`
++ that individual i considers as equally desirable as
xi :
¸!(xi;Ri) := minf¸ 2 R+ j ¸! Ri xig:
Then, compare the situations (xi;Ri) and (yj;Rj) by the index ¸!:
(xi;Ri) % (yj;Rj) , ¸!(xi;Ri) ¸ ¸!(yj;Rj):
(2) The money-metric interpersonal comparisons.
For each individual i, each bundle xi and each preference relation Ri, calculate the mini-
mum amount of expenditure needed to obtain the same satisfaction as with xi when the




e 2 R+ j 9yi 2 R
`
+; p
¤yi · e and yi Ri xi
ª
:
7For such an argument, see, e.g., Fleurbaey (2007a).
20Then, compare the situations (xi;Ri) and (yj;Rj) by the expenditure function ep¤:
(xi;Ri) % (yj;Rj) , ep¤(xi;Ri) ¸ ep¤(yj;Rj):
It is not diﬃcult to provide axiomatic justiﬁcations of these interpersonal rankings.
Consider the following axioms, which involve the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle restricted
to some speciﬁc situations. The ﬁrst axiom restricts the application of the principle to
allocations in which all bundles are proportional to the reference bundle.
Pigou-Dalton for !-Proportional Bundles For all S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, and all
xS;yS 2 R
jSj`
+ , if xi and yi are proportional to ! for all i 2 S, and there exist i;j 2 S
and ± 2 R`
++ such that
yi À xi = yi ¡ ± À xj = yj + ± À yj;
and xk = yk for all k 6= i;j, then (xS;RS) % (yT;RT).
The second axiom restricts the application of the Pigou-Dalton principle to alloca-
tions in which all bundles are chosen by the agents in budgets deﬁned with the price
vector p¤: Let us say that, for a given Ri; a bundle xi is “best for its p¤-value” if for all
q 2 R`
+ such that p¤q · p¤xi; one has xi Ri q:
Pigou-Dalton for p¤-Budgets For all S 2 S, all RS 2 RjSj, and all xS;yS 2 R
jSj`
+ , if xi
and yi are best for their p¤-value for all i 2 S; and there exist i;j 2 S and ± 2 R`
++
such that
yi À xi = yi ¡ ± À xj = yj + ± À yj;
and xk = yk for all k 6= i;j, then (xS;RS) % (yT;RT).
If either of these two axioms is added to the list of axioms of Theorems 1, 2 or 3,
then one obtains the Pazner-Schmeidler or the minimum expenditure comparison in the
interpersonal comparison part of the corresponding ordering. We only state one of these
results and leave it to the reader to formulate the other similar theorems.
21Theorem 4 Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Individual Hansson Independence, and Individual Continuity. Then, % satisﬁes Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, Replication Indiﬀerence, and Pigou-Dalton for
!-Proportional Bundles if and only if it is the relative leximin ordering with the Pazner-
Schmeidler interpersonal comparisons: For all i;j 2 N; and all (xi;Ri);(yj;Rj) 2 X £R;
(xi;Ri) % (yj;Rj) if and only if ¸!(xi;Ri) ¸ ¸!(yj;Rj):
Proof. Assume that a universal social ordering % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty,
Hansson Independence, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, Replication In-
diﬀerence, and Pigou-Dalton for !-Proportional Bundles. By Theorem 1, it is a (relative)
leximin ordering.
Suppose, on the contrary, that it does not always rely on Pazner-Schmeidler com-
parisons. Then there are two individual states (yi;Ri) and (yj;Rj) such that either
(yi;Ri) - (yj;Rj) although ¸!(yi;Ri) > ¸!(yj;Rj); or (yi;Ri) Á (yj;Rj) although
¸!(yi;Ri) ¸ ¸!(yj;Rj) By Consumer Sovereignty, there is no loss of generality in assuming
that yi and yj are proportional to !; implying that ¸!(yi;Ri)! = yi and ¸!(yj;Rj)! = yj:
Consider the ﬁrst case. Let ± 2 R`
++ be proportional to ! and be such that
yi À xi = yi ¡ ± À xj = yj + ± À yj:
By Pigou-Dalton for !-Proportional Bundles, ((xi;xj);(Ri;Rj)) % ((yi;yj);(Ri;Rj)): On
the other hand, by Consumer Sovereignty,
(xi;Ri) Á (yi;Ri) - (yj;Rj) Á (xj;Rj);
which implies, as % is a leximin ordering, that ((xi;xj);(Ri;Rj)) Á ((yi;yj);(Ri;Rj)); a
contradiction.
Consider the second case. By Individual Continuity, there is zi 2 X (proportional to
!) such that (yi;Ri) Á (zi;Ri) Á (yj;Rj) and ¸!(zi;Ri) > ¸!(yj;Rj): This is impossible
because it is an instance of the ﬁrst case.
Therefore (yi;Ri) - (yj;Rj) if and only if ¸!(yi;Ri) · ¸!(yj;Rj):
22Conversely, if a universal social ordering % is a relative leximin ordering with Pazner-
Schmeidler interpersonal comparisons, then obviously it satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton for !-
Proportional Bundles.
8 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the notion of universal social orderings and proposed two types
of solutions derived from an axiomatic analysis. The relative leximin orderings are suit-
able in contexts where population size is a matter of indiﬀerence, such as international
comparisons of living standards. In contrast, the critical level leximin orderings are not
indiﬀerent about population size and appears relevant for the evaluation of global popu-
lations or economic growth.
The proofs of the results reveal that three ingredients of a universal social ordering
have been analyzed separately here: 1) the aggregation criterion deﬁnes the degree of
inequality aversion in the trade-oﬀ between conﬂicting individual interests (Lemma 7);
2) the comparison of situations with diﬀerent population sizes involves speciﬁc axioms
like Replication Indiﬀerence or Indiﬀerent Addition (Theorems 1–3); 3) interpersonal
comparisons are speciﬁed with the help of other axioms which have been introduced after
the others (Theorem 4). This separation may be speciﬁc to our list of axioms, as the
literature on social orderings contains results in which parts (1) and (3) are intertwined.8
With the speciﬁcation of interpersonal comparisons as exempliﬁed in the previous
section, the relative leximin orderings are fully speciﬁed. But for the critical level leximin,
the critical level remains to be determined, even if one accepts the conclusion of Theorem
3 that it should be a constant. We suspect that our framework, although more concrete
than the standard model of the welfare economics of population, is still too abstract to help
determine what the critical level should be. A theory of the critical level would require
a richer description of lives, enabling the analyst to decipher the conditions deciding
whether a life is worth living for an individual, or worth adding to a given society. We
8See in particular Maniquet and Sprumont (2004).
23leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix
The appendix checks that each axiom is needed for the necessity parts of the theorems.
That is, for each theorem in Section 4, we show that removing an axiom creates new possi-
ble universal social orderings. Let ¸lex denote the leximin ordering on real vectors (i.e., it




Deﬁne % by reference to an arbitrary price vector p 2 R`
++ as follows: for all S;T 2 S,
all (xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0












This ordering satisﬁes Individual Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, but violates Con-
sumer Sovereignty and is not a leximin ordering.
(2) Individual Hansson Independence.
Let R¤ ½ R be the set of preference orderings R for which there exists a continuous
utility function UR representing R such that UR(0) = 0 and UR(xi) + UR(xj) ¸ UR(yi) +
25UR(yj) whenever there exists ± 2 R`
++ such that
yi À xi = yi ¡ ± À xj = yj + ± À yj:
Let R¤¤ = R n R
¤: The set R¤¤ is not empty, as can be shown by the following example.
Let X = R2
+; and let R be deﬁned by the following utility function v : (i) v(x1;x2) = x1+
1¡1=x2 for x2 > 0; (ii) v(x1;x2) = ¡1 for x2 = 0: The ordering R is continuous, convex,
and weakly monotonic. Suppose that R has another representation UR satisfying the above
properties. As UR(0) = 0; there is q 2 (0;1) such that 0 < UR(q;q) < UR(1;1)=2: Let (t;s)
be such that ts = 1 and t > maxf3;¡2v(q;q)g: The fact that t > ¡2v(q;q) implies that
v(t¡1;2s=3) < v(q;q) because v(t¡1;2s=3) = t¡3=(2s) = ¡t=2: Since v(t¡1;2s=3) <
v(q;q); one also has UR(t ¡ 1;2s=3) < UR(q;q) and, a fortiori, UR(t ¡ 2;s=3) < UR(q;q):
Therefore,
UR(t ¡ 2;s=3) + UR(t ¡ 1;2s=3) < 2UR(q;q) < UR(1;1):
On the other hand,
(t;s) À (t ¡ 1;2s=3) = (t;s) ¡ (1;s=3) À
(t ¡ 2;s=3) = (t ¡ 3;0) + (1;s=3) À (t ¡ 3;0);
which implies, by the second property of UR;
UR(t ¡ 2;s=3) + UR(t ¡ 1;2s=3) ¸ UR(t ¡ 3;0) + UR(t;s):
As UR(t ¡ 3;0) ¸ 0; one has UR(t ¡ 3;0) + UR(t;s) ¸ UR(1;1); implying
UR(t ¡ 2;s=3) + UR(t ¡ 1;2s=3) ¸ UR(1;1):
This yields a contradiction, therefore R has no representation UR satisfying the required
properties.
Let %PS be the relative leximin ordering with the Pazner-Schmeidler interpersonal
comparisons by the reference bundle ! 2 X:
Deﬁne % as follows. For each R 2 R¤, choose a utility function UR representing R
that satisﬁes the above conditions. For all S;T 2 S such that jSj = jTj; all (xS;RS) 2
26(R`
+ £ R)jSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0


















(xi;Ri)i2fj2SjRj = 2R¤g %PS (yi;R
0
i)i2fj2TjR0
j = 2R¤g ;
with the convention that
P
i2? URi(xi) = 0 and for all (xS;RS) 2 (R`
+ £ R)jSj;
(xS;RS) ÂPS (yi;R0
i)i2? : When jSj 6= jTj; (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if
(xjTjS;RjTjS) % (yjSjT;R0
jSjT) as deﬁned above.
This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton
for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, but violates Individual
Hansson Independence and is not a leximin ordering.
(3) Individual Continuity.
Deﬁne % as follows. For all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 (R`
+ £ R)jSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2
(X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if either
(i) (xS;RS) ÂPS (yT;R0
T); or
(ii) (xS;RS) »PS (yT;R0
T) and jTj times the number of agents i from S for which xiPiq
for all q 2 R`
+ n R`
++ is at least as great as jSj times the number of agents i from T for
which yiP 0
iq for all q 2 R`
+ n R`
++:
This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence,
Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, but vi-
olates Individual Continuity and is not a leximin ordering, as can be seen by the following
example. Let x1 = y1 = !; x2 = x3 = y2 = y3 = 2!. Let R1 and R0
2 = R0
3 be Leontief
preferences (with cusp on the ray of !), and R0
1; R2 = R3 be linear preferences. If % were



























27(4) Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences.


















This % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, Individual
Continuity, Separability, and Replication Indiﬀerence, but violates Pigou-Dalton for Equal
Preferences and is not a leximin ordering.
(5) Separability.
Let ! 2 X be given. Deﬁne % as follows. For all i;j 2 N, all Ri;Rj 2 R, (xi;Ri) %
(yj;Rj) if and only if ¸!(xi;Ri) ¸ ¸!(yj;Rj). For all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 (X £R)jSj,
and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if µ1(xS;RS) % µ1(yT;R0
T):
This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, In-
dividual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and Replication Indiﬀerence,
but violates Separability and is not a leximin ordering.
(6) Replication Indiﬀerence
The critical level leximin ordering with the Pazner-Schmeidler interpersonal compar-
isons satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, Individual Con-
tinuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and Separability, but violates Replication
Indiﬀerence and is not a relative leximin ordering.
Theorem 2
(1) Consumer Sovereignty
Let p 2 R`
++ be given. Deﬁne % as follows: for all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 (X£R)jSj,
and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0







28This ordering satisﬁes Individual Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-
Dalton for Equal Preferences, (Strong) Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, but violates
Consumer Sovereignty and is not a leximin ordering.
(2) Individual Hansson Independence
Let %PS0 be the critical level leximin ordering with the Pazner-Schmeidler interper-
sonal comparisons by the reference bundle ! 2 X and the critical level being (x0;R0) for
some ﬁxed x0 2 X and some ﬁxed R0 2 R¤¤:
Deﬁne % as follows. For all S;T 2 S such that jSj = jTj; all (xS;RS) 2 (R`
+ £R)jSj,
and all (yT;R0
T) 2 (X £ R)jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0


















(xi;Ri)i2fj2SjRj = 2R¤g %PS0 (yi;R
0
i)i2fj2TjR0
j = 2R¤g :
For all S;T 2 S with jSj < jTj, all (xS;RS) 2 (R`




T) if and only if (xS[Q;RS[Q) % (yT;R0
T) as deﬁned above, where
jS [ Qj = jTj and (xQ;RQ) = ((x0;R0);:::;(x0;R0)); and (yT;R0
T) % (xS;RS) if and
only if (yT;R0
T) % (xS[Q;RS[Q).
This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for
Equal Preferences, (Strong) Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, but violates Individual
Hansson Independence and is not a leximin ordering.
(3) Individual Continuity.
Let %¤ denote the ordering deﬁned in (3) for Theorem 1, and let (x0;R0) 2 X £ R
be given. Deﬁne % as follows. For all S;T 2 S with jSj = jTj, % coincides with %¤. For
all S;T 2 S with jSj < jTj, all (xS;RS) 2 (R`




T) if and only if (xS[Q;RS[Q) %¤ (yT;R0
T) where (xQ;RQ) =
((x0;R0);:::;(x0;R0)); and (yT;R0
T) % (xS;RS) if and only if (yT;R0
T) %¤ (xS[Q;RS[Q).
29This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence,
Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, (Strong) Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, but
violates Individual Continuity, and is not a leximin ordering.
(4) Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences














This % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, Individual
Continuity, (Strong) Separability, and Indiﬀerent Addition, but violates Pigou-Dalton for
Equal Preferences and is not a leximin ordering.
(5) Separability
Deﬁne % as in (5) for Theorem 1. Then, % satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual
Hansson Independence, Individual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and
Indiﬀerent Addition, but violates Separability and is not a leximin ordering.
(6) Indiﬀerent Addition
Deﬁne % as follows. For all S;T 2 S, all (xS;RS) 2 (X £ R)jSj, and all (yT;R0
T) 2
(X £ R)jTj,
(i) if jSj > jTj, then (xS;RS) Â (yT;R0
T), and
(ii) if jSj = jTj, (xS;RS) % (yT;R0
T) if and only if (xS;RS) %PS (yT;R0
T).
This ordering satisﬁes Consumer Sovereignty, Individual Hansson Independence, In-
dividual Continuity, Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, and (Strong) Separability, but
violates Indiﬀerent Addition and is not a critical level leximin ordering.
Theorem 3
The examples for Theorem 2 also show that each axiom in Theorem 3 is necessary for its
necessity part.
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